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Contract of Mutual (In)Difference: Governance
and the Humanitarian Apparatus in
Contemporary Albania and Kosovo
MARIELLA PANDOLFI
INTRODUCTION
In his book Le malheur des autres, Bernard Kouchner, the founder of
M~decins Sans Fronti~res and the former French Health Minister, wrote that
"[h]umanitarian activities have become customary."' Kouchner's statement
points to the new forms of globally organized power and expertise, located
within new transnational regimes, humanitarian networks, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and multi- and bilateral organizations that are now
developing. These new transnational regimes, parallel to local forms of rule,
constitute a mobile apparatus which I have defined as migrant sovereignties.
2
With the explosive growth of NGOs of all scales and varieties that has
occurred since 1945, we are witnessing a massive transformation in the nature
of global governance.3 Such growth has been fueled by the connected
development of the U.N. system, and, more particularly, by the increasing
global circulation and legitimization of discourse and politics of "human
rights." Resolutions adopted by the U.N. Security Council and various
international agencies and meetings show that new forms of sovereignty have
come into place alongside older, territorialized forms. These new forms
legitimize the right of interference and intervention, identifying a
* Professor, Department of Anthropology, University of Montreal. pandolfm@anthro.umontreal.ca.
1. BERNARD KOUCHNER, LE MALHEUR DES AUTRES 313 (1991).
2. See Mariella Pandolfi, L 'industrie humanitaire: une souveranetd mouvante et supracoloniale.
Reflexion sur l'expirience des Balkans, 3 MULTITUDES 97-105 (2000); see also Arjun Appadurai,
Sovereignty Without Territoriality: Notes for a Postnational Geography, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF IDENTITY
40-58 (Patricia Yaeger ed., 1996); ARJuN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF
GLOBALISATION (1996). Drawing on Appadurai's notion of mobile sovereignty, we can define these
transnational formations as migrant sovereignties which serve to link transnational forms of domination over
local political practices. The intricate network of the humanitarian political-economic-military complex that is
superimposed as a migrant sovereignty upon Albanian society does not conceive any strategy of negotiation
with its political, institutional, and social actors.
3. See generally Anne Marie Clark, Non-Governmental Organisations and Their Influence on
International Society, 48 J. INT'L AFF. 509-24 (1995).
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deterritorialized sovereignty that migrates around the globe to sites of "crisis"
and humanitarian disaster.
At a time when international humanitarian processes are proliferating in
militarized contexts the world over, it is imperative that we take time to reflect
on the theoretical foundations, as well as the practical consequences, of such
interventions. This is a perilous but necessary exercise, forcing us to consider
the complex relationship between humanitarian organizations, international
institutions, and specific segments of local 6lites. This paper addresses the
ways in which the humanitarian-military apparatus constructs the logic behind
its interventions, how interventions are carried out, and how they impact the
local scene. It aims to identify the means by which institutional categories and
interventions are transferred into this local political sphere and canonized as
models of governance.
My work is specifically concerned with the post-war and post-communist
Balkan territories and the assemblages that crisscross those territories.4 From
1991 until the crucial months of the war, the international presence in Albania
and Kosovo was active at various institutional levels. The true agents of
military-economic-humanitarian action were the various international
organizations, agencies, foundations, and NGOs, whose operations were shaped
by a temporality of emergency. These agents espouse the legitimacy of the
right of interference, the rhetoric of institution building, and a Western, neo-
liberal, forced democratization of the southeastern European frontier. The
power they wield is real, and is superimposed onto bureaucratic procedures and
lengthy intergovernmental negotiations.5
The title of this paper--Contract of Mutual (In)Difference-seeks to draw
attention to a central feature of our age that has gained prominence over the
past ten years: the coexistence, within the same territorial perimeter, of two
opposed modes of sovereignty. One of these is tied to a territorial configuration
such as the nation-state, religion, or ethnicity. The other, which has resulted
from the proliferation of non-territorialized forms of power and governance,
such as the complex military-humanitarian apparatus, is deployed, legitimized,
and imposed according to a planetary logic in "crisis" situations by an
international "humanitarian" rule of law.
4. See, e.g., Mariella Pandolfi, "Moral entrepreneurs", souvrainetis mouvants et barbelds. Le bio-
politique dans les Balkans post-communistes, 26 ANTHROPOLOGIE ET SOCIETE 29-51 (2002).
5. See JEAN-CHRISTOPHE RUFIN, L'AVENTURE HUMANITAIRE (1994); see also Jean-Christophe Rufin,
Pour 1 'humanitaire. Dipasser le sentiment d'6chec, 105 LE DEBAT 4-21 (1999) [hereinafter Rufin, Pour
l 'humanitaire].
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This discussion draws on fieldwork conducted in Albania and Kosovo
since 1997, which has allowed me to travel behind the lines, so to speak, of the
humanitarian apparatus. My argument is that military forces and multi- and
bilateral organizations are transforming into a new form of transnational
domination.6
I will begin by describing the convergence between military and
humanitarian forms of intervention, and the role of NGOs as operators of a new
military-humanitarian form of governance. I will show that the forms of
governance that are expressed through NGOs can be understood as a new form
of sovereignty, at the intersection of biopolitics 7 and "bare life," which is
apparent in the way that international intervention manages bodies according to
humanitarian categories. Finally, I will discuss how, in the aftermath of the
humanitarian war in Kosovo, this new sovereignty has left behind a residue of
humanitarian forms of governance, even as it moves to new sites of
intervention.
I. HUMANITARIAN WARS, THE CULTURE OF INTERVENTION, AND THE ROLE
OF NGOS
Military and humanitarian intervention has a historical pedigree dating back
to the face-off between European power and the Ottoman Empire in the
nineteenth century. The first humanitarian war can be identified with the
arrival of the French in Lebanon in 1860. This intervention aimed to protect
Maronite Christians from Muslim attacks and occurred after 6,000 Maronites
had been slaughtered by the Druses. I define the humanitarian apparatus as the
entire complex of ideologies, organizational strategies, and actions that unfold
due to pressure exerted by two elements: the right to interfere and the
temporality of emergency. Proliferating through the twentieth century, NGOs
6. See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, THE NEW MILITARY HUMANISM: LESSONS FROM Kosovo (1999).
7. 1 use the term biopolitics in the manner developed by Michel Foucault to refer to the ensemble of
administrative practices - schooling, policing, caring - that came to be used to administer populations
with the rise of the modem state. See generally I MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert
Hurley trans., 1978); see also 3, 4 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DITS ET tCRITS: 1954 - 1988 (1994). Giorgio
Agamben wrote "[alccording to Foucault, a society's 'threshold of biological modernity' is situated at the
point at which the species and the individual as a simple living body become what is at stake in a society's
political strategies." GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (Daniel Heller-
Roazen trans., 1998) [hereinafter HOMO SACER]. Michael Hardt and Toni Negri have further developed this
concept to examine how these practices produce regimes of rule in the contemporary world that are radically
limited to the management of life in the barest terms, as in concentration or refugee camps or in capitalist
production. See generally MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (2000).
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have increasingly positioned themselves as a challenge to governments and
occupied roles left vacant by government institutions. At other times, they have
acted as a counterpoint to government actors, being much more agile at opening
channels of intervention. By means of their own networks, international NGOs
have created a direct and independent form of non-governmental diplomacy,
allowing them to act in parallel to state governments.
Since 1993, the number of states that have appealed to NGOs as ad hoc
experts in procedures and development of international agreements has
increased tremendously. Their economic and intellectual resources, and their
ability to manage information, have allowed a number of NGOs to acquire an
authority that has often superseded that of state administrative bodies.8 The
increased relevance of their role vis-A-vis donors (nation-states and public
institutions) is the result of their flexibility, mobility, and transnational
expertise. This strategic capability allows them to intervene promptly in all
comers of the globe, to maintain a transnational communication network, and
finally to produce testimony.
In the "New World Order," crisis management integrates the roles of
military and humanitarian aid. Veronique de Geoffroy discusses the military-
humanitarian or civilian-military formula by noting that the vocabularies of
these two realms are beginning to come together. 9 In both contexts, one speaks
of an "area of responsibility" or of "projecting onto an area," and so forth-
originally military expressions. Humanitarianism, as John Prendergast reminds
us, cannot be viewed as a civil religion, or as an act of faith. In other words, it
is a mode of historical action, which has social, economical and political
consequences.' 0
Observing the diverse interpretations of humanitarian intervention, one
soon discovers that the conventional discourse conceals a paradox. On the one
hand, humanitarian aid is perceived as action that tends to consolidate state
sovereignty, understood as a form of government in its multiple local and
global political forms; on the other hand, humanitarian intervention is
constructed as a measure of the progressive erosion of state sovereignty-in the
8. After Bosnia, the humanitarian industry has constructed its own legitimacy to intervene, even militarily.
Yet Bosnia was not the first time the industry intervened; in 1992, when Somalia witnessed Operation Restore
Hope, forty international NGOs were present in that country. The second example of this type of mobilization
was in November 1993, when seventy-six NGOs were set up in Rwanda.
9. See Veronique de Geoffroy, Militaro-humanitaire ou civilo-militaire?, 12 MOUVEMENTS 49-54 (2000).
10. See generally JOHN PRENDERGAST, CRISIS RESPONSE: HUMANITARIAN BAND-AIDS IN SUDAN AND
SOMALIA 3 (1997).
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name of the principles and practices of its own political organization-that
extends over the whole planet. Both of these positions are projected onto a
transnational scene in which relations and institutions distinct to each sovereign
state are increasingly confused due to the more general pressure of
globalization. The entire humanitarian apparatus legitimizes its presence in the
name of an ethical and temporal rule that may be defined as the "culture of
emergency."
II. PROBLEMATIZING SOVEREIGNTY: BIOPOWER AND BARE LIFE
From varying perspectives, political scientists and international lawyers
have identified four different ways of defining the concept of sovereignty today:
(1) domestic sovereignty; (2) independent sovereignty; (3) Westphalian
sovereignty; and (4) international legal sovereignty.1 In contrast, over the last
decade, anthropology has approached the problem of sovereignty
ethnographically, "confronting" these typologies of sovereignty with a
biopolitical notion of sovereignty. This work has drawn on theoretical concepts
from the writings of Michel Foucault and, more recently, those of Giorgio
Agamben. 12 Such displacement toward a "critical" zone of sovereignty-an
intertwining of sovereignty and biopolitics-has allowed anthropology to adopt
a more refined position than that of a mere accountant of different forms of
sovereignty.
Foucault summarizes the formula for classical sovereignty as the
prerogative to the right over life and death: the power to take life or let live in a
given territory. 13 Biopolitics designates a reversal, or rather the contemporary
metamorphosis, of this sovereign power, in that it is also exercised as the power
to let die or to make live. Power, understood this way, implies an enormous
expansion in its potential to dominate. While classical law reasoned about the
individual and society, and the disciplines considered individuals and their
I1. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 3 (1999).
12. See generally GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE COMING COMMUNITY (Michael Hardt trans., 1993)
[hereinafter THE COMING COMMUNITY]; HOMO SACER, supra note 7; GIORGIO AGAMBEN, MEANS WITHOUT
END: NOTES ON POLITICS (Vincenzo Binetti & Cesare Casarino trans., 2000) [hereinafter MEANS WITHOUT
END].
13. Foucault develops the term classical sovereignty at length, expressing classical sovereignty most
succinctly as the power of life or death exercised by the sovereign ruler over his subjects: the King can
condemn to death, or allow to live, anyone in the territory he rules. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, IL
FAUT DtFENDRE LA SOCItTt: COURS AU COLLtGE DE FRANCE 1975-1976 (1997).
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bodies, biopolitics has as its focus entire populations, considered as biological
and political problems.
In the case of the fall of traditional forms of sovereignty, there is also a
collapse of official identity, which is what allows people to locate their lives at
the juncture between the present situation within living humanity and one's
belonging to the eternal human race. Politics is no longer geopolitics, and
power no longer stops at the domination of subjects retained within real and
institutional frontiers of States, or in the no-man's land of international
relations. Power has become biopolitics.
The exercise of biopolitical sovereignty extends so far that the sovereign
human being is stripped to the barest choice of life. In other words, the only
choice left is located in what Primo Levi called "the gray zone," that is, the
nonliving and the non-dying. 14 Agamben describes this space as Bare Life-
the absolute political substance that, once isolated, allows the total definition of
the subject's identity in demographic, ethnic, national or political terms.'5
This slippage of our present age has occurred not only in order to legitimize
ethnic cleansing and genocide, but also in the name of compassion, for the sake
of protection and cure, in the name of what Fassin has defined as la politique
du vivant (the politics of life).' 6 This is the paradox that I want to address. The
radical and central aspect of our democratic management-protecting victims,
organizing health policies, codifying the new frontiers of genetics, intervening
during "emergency" humanitarian catastrophes-assumes the logic of
biopolitical technology.
Biopolitics thus reveals an inversion in the deployment of power-the
reduction of subjective trajectories, of individuals, of men and women, to
bodies. Such indistinct, displaced, and localized bodies come to be classified
and defined as refugees, legal or illegal immigrants, or traumatized victims
according to the diagnostic categories of humanitarian management.
I would thus locate the catalogue of human suffering inscribed by the
deployment of "humanitarian" biopower at the juncture between two
conceptual domains: that of "governmentality," which Foucault defined "as
running through the totality constituted by instructions, procedures, analyses,
tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific though extremely complex
14. See PRIMO LEVI, THE DROWNED AND THE SAVED 20, 42-3 (Raymond Rosenthal trans., 1988) (1986).
15. The notion of bare life is more fully developed in HOMO SACER, supra note 7.
16. Didier Fassin, Entrepolitiques du vivant etpolitiques de la vie. Pour une anthropologie de la santi, 1
LES NOTES DE RECHERCHt DU CRESP 13 (2000), available at http://www.inserm.fr/cresp/cresp.nsf.
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form of power, which has as its locus the population and as its essential
technical instrument, security apparatuses,'' 17 and that of the intersection of
rights with biopower as developed by Agamben. The separation between
humanitarianism and politics that we are experiencing today is the extreme
phase of the separation of the rights of man from the rights of the citizen. In the
final analysis, however, humanitarian organizations - which today are more
and more supported by international commissions - can only grasp human life
in the figure of bare or sacred life, and therefore, despite themselves, maintain a
secret solidarity with the very powers they ought to fight.' 8 Following
Foucault, I view biopower as an articulation of the political with the biological;
following Agamben, this also means recognition of the paradox and the risk
implied in the rule of law in modem democracies.
For Agamben there are two models of power, ajuridical one focused on the
problem of the legitimacy of Western power (the problem of sovereignty), and a
non-juridical model centered on the problem of the effectiveness of Western
power.19 These two models meet in the dimension of exception. 20 Agamben
writes:
What is the place of sovereignty? If the sovereign, in the
words of Carl Schmidt, is the one who may proclaim the state
of exception and thus legally suspend the validity of law, then
the space of sovereignty is a paradoxical space, as it lies both
within and without the juridical order.
What is an exception? It is a form of exclusion. It is a single
case that is excluded from the general rule. But what
characterizes the exception is that what is considered as
excluded in reality maintains a relationship with the law, albeit
21in the form of a suspension.
The fundamental operation of power is to isolate a bare life in each subject,
a life that is irremediably exposed to sovereign decisions. Within the space of
17. Michel Foucault, La gouvernementaliti, 54 ACTES 10, 18 (1986).
18. HOMO SACER, supra note 7, at 133.
19. Id. at 5.
20. See generally HOMO SACER, supra note 7; MEANS WITHOUT END, supra note 12; THE COMING
COMMUNITY, supra note 12; Giorgio Agamben, Politica dell'esilio, 16 DERIVE E APPRODI 25-27 (1998)
[hereinafter Agamben, Politica dell'esilio].
21. Agamben, Politica dell'esilio, supra note 20, at 25 (author translation).
376 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 10:369
exception, a sovereign decision is exercised without mediation. Agamben
observes and describes with ruthless sobriety the human destiny of the
individual, the group, and the population at the moment in which it enters into
12this zone of arbitrariness. In many areas of anthropological work, we are
similarly confronted with the arbitrariness of rendering the human being no
longer as a citizen, but as a bare life, a zoe.
III. "BARE LIFE" AND EMERGENCY IN KOSOVO AND ALBANIA
The places where the juridical state of suspension is activated may be
refugee camps, or, as I have found in my research in Kosovo and Albania, the
ambiguous setting-in-motion of the entire humanitarian apparatus. In all of
these places individuals become a "population" to be numbered, ethnicized, and
catalogued. In the process of humanitarian intervention, the state of exception
is legitimized by the category of "emergency," which is a category of action
recognized by law.
Determined as a temporal and temporary derogation in a precise context,
the emergency category is "logically" opposed to the category of the ordinary.
Paradoxically, emergency no longer constitutes an extraordinary or exceptional
temporal category in humanitarian intervention. In the territories of
humanitarian intervention, it has become the sole temporal modality of the new
social contract, which includes the right of interference, temporality of
23
emergency, and necessity of action.
The occupation of space, the invasion of territory, and the crossing of
borders are characterized by the need for mobility and speed in intervention; the
humanitarian apparatus is in fact constructed on the logic of action.
Responding to the priorities of international donors and bureaucratic
frameworks, a thousand traces of action, often contradictory, propagate. They
are performed by social actors concealing a profound ambivalence, if not
24hostility, toward the institutions that require action. Humanitarian
universalism bears an anti-state and anti-institutional current of rebellion,
22. See generally GIORGIO AGAMBEN, REMNANTS OF AUSCHWITZ: THE WITNESS AND THE ARCHIVE
(Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., 1999).
23. Many protagonists of the humanitarian scene belong to the generation of 1968, which has always been
mistrustful of institutions and local and national governments.
24. See generally GIORGIO AGAMBEN, MEANS WITHOUT END: NOTES ON POLITICS (Vincenzo Binetti &
Cesare Casarino trans., 2000); see also generally Michael Hardt & Thomas Dumm, Sovereignty, Multitudes,
Absolute Democracy: A Discussion Between Michael Hardt and Thomas Dumm About Hardt and Negri's
Empire, in 4 THEORY & EVENT (2000), at http://muse.jhu.edu/joumals/theory_andevent/v004/4.3hardt.html.
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moving instead according to what LaYdi has more recently called planetary
time.25 The emotional components of the single humanitarian choice are also
multiple and confused, and are often experienced in contradictory ways by
single individuals, who may experience a mixture of pietas and cynicism, of the
desire for adventure and the necessity to be present in the mediatized arena, of
money and emergency, of bureaucracy and anti-ideology.
Edward Said has held that the discursive forms that feed a colonial power
function not only as an instrumental form of consciousness, but also as an
ambivalent protocol for imagination and desire.26 Such recognition appears
central for understanding how the humanitarian emergency constructs, feeds,
and reinforces a power that under the guise of neutrality imposes rules of spatial
and temporal compression.
The rhetoric of pietas, the one-dimensional construction of the enemy, and
the "moral" necessity of simultaneous and fragmented action are discursive
constructions that stifle any dissident or alternative voice. Witnessing is the
central element in this regime of governmentality.
IV. MIGRANT SOVEREIGNTY IN THE AFTERMATH OF EMERGENCY
The overall feature present in most interviews of experts or aid workers
active in the humanitarian apparatus is the trope of personal witnessing: "I saw,
I was.. ." is often rendered as "I did Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, and I will surely
do Macedonia and Afghanistan.,
27
25. Zaki Lafdi, L 'urgence Cu la divalorisation culturelle del 'avenir in URGENCESOUFFRANCE, :SRE
LUTTE HUMANITAIRE OU POLITIQUE SOCIALE? 43-59 (Marc-Henry Soulet ed., 1998).
26. See generally EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978).
27. The "confidential" report is a key cultural facet of the humanitarian world connecting press officers,
general managers, officers-in-charge, local elites, intellectuals, and especially journalists. Anyone who
possesses, transmits, or receives a confidential report immediately increases his or her own credibility within
the local context of humanitarian operations. During the war in Kosovo, strictly "confidential" documents
from Brussels, Washington, the World Bank, and other strategic studies' think-tanks circulated widely in
Tirana. The effect of confidential reports, then, is two-fold. On one level, they produce a discourse on the
locals which is taken up in the international circuit. On another level, their channels of circulation serve to
create a bipolar society within the local with, at one end, the 61ites who lavishly display their access to
information and, at the other, those who are constructed as passive objects of knowledge. In this sense we can
speak of a machine for producing hierarchies and top-down power flows. On one side, one finds the sectors
of society in an implicit partnership with transnational values and agencies maintained through continuous
dialogue and collaboration. On the other side, one finds a passive marginalized sector of the local society,
which may also include those government representatives who have failed to become part of the international
organization circuit. Humanitarian intervention introduces a wedge within local societies, splitting them into
two separate parts.
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As Rufin notes, the temptation to conceive all humanitarian matters as
inherently innocent, so deep-seated in Western consciousness, is
increasingly at variance with reality, because today
humanitarianism has entered the era of high complexity...
which cannot accommodate either romantic tendencies or the
desire to "naturalize" war, which forgets that conflicts are not
engendered by some sort of barbarian absurdity born out of
some kind of tribalism, or the result of an excess of extremist
fury, but always have "political" origins.28
One cannot dispute the legitimacy of an intervention seeking to help
victims on the ground or to rebuild a nation where massacres have taken place.
Yet as soon as the media leave the scene of the "humanitarian disaster," the
theater of generosity loses its actors.
In Albania, during the three-month-long war of 1999, the emergency
provoked the deployment of an enormous apparatus of humanitarian
organizations 29 to accommodate 500,000 refugees. In so doing, for the sake of
efficiency and experience, it also interrupted negotiating activities with local
institutions and with international diplomats present in Albania. Within twelve
days, NATO, the international military force (AFOR3°), and the bilateral and
multilateral bodies active in Albania at the time had superseded the embassies
and local government. The international organizations proposed that they
administer ninety percent of the necessary aid themselves, with the remaining
ten percent administered at the local level. Yet within two weeks, even this ten
percent had been appropriated by the ad hoc intervention force. NATO's
military logistical infrastructure was deployed with such "efficiency" that it had
the whole territory under its control, assigning responsibilities and distributing
roles. It was a global strategy of control that took advantage of economists,
business consultants, and administrators who had earned their Masters' from
the most prestigious American universities.
28. Rufin, Pour l'humanitaire, supra note 5, at 10, 20.
29. In Albania from April to July 1999, AFOR had 19 nationalities in its ranks, over 7,000 NATO soldiers,
4 groups of observers, including two from the Organisation for Co-operation and Security in Europe (OCSE),
and a dozen people from Western special government missions. During the Kosovo conflict, 180 international
NGOs were present in Albania. The result in Kosovo, one year after the conflict: 40,000 soldiers from KFOR
(a NATO-led, international security force), and 20,000 civilians (working for UNMIK, United Nations
Mission in Kosovo, and international NGOs).
30. Albanian United Nations Military Forces.
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Wearing the badge of an international organization was enough to gain
entry into the pyramid mausoleum built by Hoxha in the center of Tirana,
which had become NATO headquarters, to view the maps-reports (updated
every three hours) on the precise number of refugees, the situation of
individuals displaced from one extremity to the other of the country, epidemics,
the quantity of available drugs and where they were needed, the number of
showers, how many toilets were needed in a specific location, and so forth. In
short, it was an organizational strategy so pervasive that it immediately
eliminated any possible alternative mode of intervention. All this, as I have
said, in the name of the need to cure, nourish, and save "human lives."
The day after the war ended, in June 1999, I was still in Albania. Within a
few days, the limelight of media compassion was turned off. Hotels were
emptied ofjournalists, officials, and international aid workers; apartment leases
were canceled. The transnational "army" was renting helicopters and cars to
move on to another site of humanitarian compassion. At the same time, ethnic
Albanians were quickly heading back to their homes in Kosovo. The end of the
war and the mass return of the Kosovars resulted in the suppression of the
"emergency" in Albania, which in a few days was to be displaced to the
"liberated" territory of Kosovo. The result was that NGOs and international
agencies active in Albania closed down their local operations and laid off their
Albanian employees, leaving behind unused material which had not even been
cleared by local customs. The emergency had moved elsewhere, and new
operations, new logistics and apparatuses, had to be put in place in and for
Kosovo.3 1
Three years later, projects that had been financed in Kosovo for the first
year after the war have been put on hold because the "emergency" provisions
have expired.32 As a consequence, available funds can no longer be used.
Moreover, the changed political situation in Serbia and the emergence of
conflicts between KFOR, the U.N. mission in Kosovo, and the Albanian
guerrillas in Macedonia have yet again displaced the focus of the "emergency."
Emergency and post-emergency are effects of suffering and violence that
are consistent with categories recognized by international protocols. The line
separating so-called "emergency" projects from "post-emergency" ones forces
31. These observations are culled from two years of fieldwork from 1998 to 2000, during which I
interviewed key officials, politicians, and civil society actors before, during, and after the conflict in Kosovo.
32. 1 observed from my interviews that the "emergency" period was an administrative definition that
allowed loosening the rules for the allocation and distribution of resources, regardless of the actual situation on
the ground.
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project directors constantly to revise their strategies at all levels in order to
adopt the right rhetoric and thus be able to keep getting the funding necessary
to keep their intervention afloat. Laidi draws attention to the existence of a
supply-effect of emergency. "As soon as emergency is professionalized, it
tends to structure itself as social supply waiting for its demand. And if the
demand does not exist, one tends to create it.",33 In other words, certain
humanitarian organizations justify their existence with a circular logic: a state
of emergency is legitimate because urgent action has to be taken.
The media-generated triangle of NATO, humanitarians, and refugees has
eliminated the other social partners involved in the conflict from the game. At
the same time, however, the "political" role that the humanitarian industry plays
has become evident as certain sectors are developed while others are neglected,
and as strategic priorities that go beyond the logic of defense, shelter, and
protection are considered, constructing transnational priorities and weakening
entire sectors of the local society that do not correspond to standards prioritized
and recognized by the intervention.
A series of categories drawn from the discursive and operative strategies of
humanitarianism is thus applied to the territory and to human beings. Such
categories may be extended to the world system of potential and real donors,
multilateral and bilateral accords, ad hoc U.N. agencies and, finally, to
programs that are much less controllable-in terms of execution of project,
budget, and so forth-if they are constructed and enacted in the period labeled
as an "emergency."
The "do something syndrome" is the response adopted by governments,
U.N. agencies, and international NGOs when confronted by the public's
concern about a crisis. "Something must be done" is a powerful justification,
particularly when further strengthened by the spectacle of distant suffering. Yet
in the final analysis it shows the dangerous gap that exists between
humanitarian "needs" and humanitarian "budgets."
It is a practice that constitutes subjects, both the operators of the
intervention whose agency is cast within the humanitarian ideology, and those
who would be their beneficiaries-the mute subjects whose dense sociality is
reduced to thin descriptions in bureaucratic reports. Thus, in exemplary
fashion, the bureaucratization of pietas, couched in the rhetoric of universalism,
efficiency, good intentions, and the need to act, imbues and determines the
33. Laidi, supra note 24, at 57.
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stream of pamphlets and confidential reports that document the humanitarian
universe.
The dimension of experience or previous individual and collective history
is erased by the new categories in which human beings are pigeonholed; the
terms "victim," "refugee," "trafficked woman," or "trauma case" do not relate
to experiences of traumatic events, but are labels by means of which it is
possible to activate procedures such as fundraising, protocols, the establishment
of transversal and transnational institutions and, ultimately, of a business whose
importance and amplitude is concealed by charitable pietas. A refugee is a
completely exportable and generic category, whether from Bosnia or the
Philippines; a trafficked woman enters into repatriation procedures whether she
is in Kosovo or in Thailand; and demilitarization is accomplished with similar
procedures whether in Africa or in South America.
CONCLUSION: THE KOSOVO "EXCEPTION" Now EXISTS FOR BETTER AND
WORSE
In conclusion, let me draw the following points. First, all humanitarian
action is legitimized by its humanitarian intentions, never by its defense of
specific interests. The legitimacy of a humanitarian operation derives from its
being conceived of as an end in itself, the expression of a humanitarian
impulse. Such an operation should not be understood as an instrumental form
of political action. Second, intervention most often occurs where there is the
sudden breakdown of a pre-existing equilibrium. Humanitarian action is
constructed out of such a "crisis," for it is here that it legitimates its operation.
Yet the notion of the breakdown of a pre-existing equilibrium is ambiguous, as
dramatic examples can testify. As underlined by the independent commission
in Kosovo (August 1999-October 2000), we need a critical approach to the
interpretation of emerging doctrine of humanitarian intervention. We need to
shed light on the grey zone that lies between an extension of international law
and a proposal for an international moral consensus where humanitarian
interventions proliferate. In essence, this grey zone goes beyond strict ideas of
legality to incorporate more flexible views of legitimacy. In a time
characterized by "failing states" and "ethnic conflicts"--an explosion in the
number of refugees and stateless persons-the humanitarian industry has
emerged as an immensely powerful biopolitical force, effectively having power
of life and death over millions the world over. It is time for this industry to be
subjected to critical scrutiny.

